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Abstract 
This article draws on research from Texas and Chicago to examine whether high-
stakes testing enables low-income and racial minority students to acquire cultural 
capital. While students’ performance on state or district tests rose after the 
implementation of high-stakes testing and accountability policies in Texas and 
Chicago in the 1990s, several studies indicate that these policies seemed to have 
had deleterious effects on curriculum, instruction, the percentage of students 
excluded from the tests, and student dropout rates. As a result, the policies seemed 
to have had mixed effects on students’ opportunities to acquire embodied and 
institutionalized cultural capital. These findings are consistent with the work of 
Shepard (2000), Darling-Hammond (2004a), and others who have written of the 
likely negative repercussions of high-stakes testing and accountability policies.  
Keywords: cultural capital, high-stakes testing, accountability, K–12 schooling in 
the U.S. 
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¿Pueden los exámenes de alto riesgo aumentar el capital cultural entre los 
estudiantes de bajos ingresos y de minorías raciales? 
Resumen 
Este artículo se basa en investigaciones hechas en Texas y Chicago para examinar si 
los exámenes de alto riesgo permiten a estudiantes de bajos ingresos y de minorías 
raciales adquirir capital cultural. Si bien el desempeño en pruebas estatales o 
distritales de los estudiantes de Texas y Chicago en los noventas mejoro después de 
la aplicación de los exámenes de alto riesgo asociados a políticas de acontabilidad 
escolar, varios estudios indican que estas políticas parecen haber tenido efectos 
nocivos sobre los planes de estudio, la instrucción, el porcentaje de estudiantes 
excluidos de las pruebas, y el índice de abandono escolar. Como resultado de ello, 
las políticas parecen haber tenido resultados mixtos en los estudiantes en cuanto a 
la oportunidad de adquirir cultural capital tanto del tipo institucional como 
corporal. Estos resultados son consistentes con los trabajos de Shepard (2000), 
Darling-Hammond (2004a), y otros que han escrito sobre las probables 
repercusiones negativas de los exámenes de alto riesgo asociados a políticas de 
acontabilidad escolar. 
Palabras clave: capital cultural, exámenes de alto riesgo, políticas acontabilidad 
escolar, la educación K-12 en los EE.UU. 
 
One goal of the recent No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation is to reduce gaps in 
achievement between white students and racial minority students and between middle-class students 
and low-income students. To measure the academic progress of these various groups over time, the 
2002 reauthorization of Title I requires states to administer annual tests in reading, writing, and 
mathematics to students in 3rd through 8th grades, to publicly report test results at the school and 
district levels, and to monitor changes in school and district performance. Further, the legislation 
mandates that schools and districts report data for racial/ethnic subgroups, Title I students, special 
needs students, ESL (English as a second language) students, migrant students, and other categories. 
With potentially severe sanctions for schools and districts that fail to make adequate yearly progress 
(AYP), supporters of NCLB argue that the law is pressuring schools to improve instruction for 
minority and low-income students, two groups that have traditionally been poorly served by public 
schools in the U.S. 
Meanwhile, others have criticized the federal legislation on a number of fronts. Some have 
raised concerns that Congress did not allocate sufficient funds to implement NCLB while others 
oppose the requirement that states administer high-stakes tests at so many grade levels (Amrein & 
Berliner, 2002; Shepard, 2000). Some question the emphasis on AYP while others contend that the 
teacher-quality provisions in NCLB are problematic (Darling-Hammond & Youngs, 2002; Smith, 
Desimone, & Ueno, 2005). As Congress prepares to reauthorize Title I in 2008 or 2009, many 
school administrators, teacher union leaders, researchers, and policy makers are proposing ways to 
change the legislation to address these issues.  
While we share some of the sentiments of critics of NCLB, we address a different matter in 
this paper. Based on research and data from Texas and Chicago, our first purpose is to investigate 
the extent to which and ways in which high-stakes testing and accountability policies provide 
opportunities for low-income and racial minority students to acquire embodied and institutionalized 
cultural capital. These forms of capital are important because they are closely related to academic 
success, college enrollment, and adult employment. A second purpose is to provide guidelines for 
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future research on high-stakes testing and accountability. Our analysis indicates that testing and 
accountability policies in Texas and Chicago provided some opportunities for low-income and racial 
minority students to acquire key forms of cultural capital. At the same time, these policies also 
seemed to limit opportunities for such students and exacerbate differences between them and white, 
middle-class students. 
In the first and second sections of this paper, we draw on cultural capital theory to present 
our conceptual framework and analytical methods. The third section reviews several studies of state 
policies in Texas to examine their effects on opportunities for low-income and racial minority 
students to acquire embodied and institutionalized cultural capital. In the fourth section, using 
studies of accountability policies in Chicago, we explore how such policies affected opportunities for 
such students to gain these forms of cultural capital. Finally, the fifth section looks across the two 
cases to discuss important findings and consider implications for future research on high-stakes 
testing and accountability. 
Embodied and Institutionalized Cultural Capital 
The conceptual framework employed in this study draws on cultural capital theory 
(Bourdieu, 1973, 1986). In modern societies, according to this theory, social institutions such as 
schools may appear to be unbiased, neutral entities, but they are, in fact, governed by rules of 
exchange that place value on the cultural norms or cultural capital of upper class and middle class 
people (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital exists in three states: embodied, institutionalized, and 
objectified (Bourdieu, 1986; Olneck, 2000).1 We focus here on the first two of these forms because 
they seem most relevant to understanding the effects of high-stakes testing on low-income and 
minority students. 
Embodied cultural capital refers to behavioral styles, ways of speaking, cultural preferences, 
and understanding of valued cultural knowledge (Olneck, 2000). Unlike high school diplomas, 
university degrees, or titles, this form of cultural capital cannot be purchased and unlike property, it 
cannot be exchanged; instead, it is learned or adopted by individuals. Bourdieu argues that schools 
do not value all students’ speaking and behavioral styles equally, but rather they place greater value 
on those of the upper and middle classes. However, unless low socio-economic status (SES) and 
minority students have opportunities to internalize dominant cultural norms, they may be 
disadvantaged by their schools with regard to school engagement and performance, college 
attendance, and employment opportunity. Indeed, researchers have shown that the lack of cultural 
capital among low-income and minority students can result in reduced access to school resources 
and academic and social supports from teachers (Lareau, 2002; Lareau & Horvat, 1999; Lee & 
Bowen, 2006). For this reason, Delpit (1995) contends that schools should explicitly teach low-SES 
and minority students to acquire cultural norms, behavioral styles and codes of power that are 
necessary for them to succeed in American society. 
In the 1990s and more recently, several policy makers and researchers have argued that a 
common curriculum linked to high-stakes testing could help low-income and minority students 
acquire the intellectual abilities and dispositions required in the 21st century societies. For example, 
O’Day and Smith (1993) posited that by making high quality knowledge and instruction available for 
                                                 
1 Objectified cultural capital refers to artifacts and other expressions of embodied cultural capital 
including literature, music, art, and film as well as the sites where these are available (e.g., university courses, 
libraries, museums, theaters, concert halls, etc.). 
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every student, a common curriculum and a common set of expectations would decrease inequity in 
education by improving the performance of students from low-income and minority families. Also, 
Ravitch (1995) and Hirsch (1996) stressed that standards-based reform would enable American 
schools to accomplish what they had never done before: educate all students well, regardless of 
social class and racial backgrounds. More recently, advocates of high-stakes testing have contended 
that NCLB and similar state policies are necessary to ensure that teachers and schools maintain high 
standards for low-SES and minority students and help them achieve at high levels (e.g., Paige, 2001; 
Grissmer et al., 2000). 
At the same time, scholars and educators have raised concerns that high-stakes testing and 
accountability policies will lead teachers to narrow the curriculum and devote inordinate amounts of 
time to preparing students to take state standardized tests (Shepard, 2000; Thompson, 2001). 
Darling-Hammond argues that overemphasis on test scores will lead to “a narrower curriculum; to 
test-based instruction that ignores critical real world skills, especially for lower-income and lower-
performing students; and to less useful and engaging education” (2004a, p. 18). Also, there is a 
growing concern that NCLB would interfere with teachers’ efforts to develop relevant curriculum 
for culturally and racially diverse students (Selwyn, 2007). If this is the case, the new accountability 
system based on test scores is not likely to help low-income and minority students to acquire 
embodied cultural capital that is valued by universities and employers.  
A second concern has been that disparities in resources severely limit the capacity of schools 
and districts serving high percentages of low SES and racial minority students. Researchers have 
documented significant differences with regard to school facilities and teacher quality between 
districts and schools serving primarily middle-class families and those mostly serving lower-income 
and minority students (Arsen & Davis, 2006; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; Loeb, Darling-
Hammond, & Luczak, 2004). Under such conditions, teachers may not have the qualifications or 
resources to help students acquire embodied cultural capital in the form of analytical, higher-order 
thinking, and problem-solving skills. 
Institutionalized cultural capital refers to degrees, credentials, grades, and test scores that 
serve as social markers to indicate that holders have specific levels or types of knowledge and skills 
(Olneck, 2000). As Labaree (1997) argues, a primary reason that individuals invest money, time, and 
effort in schooling is to acquire qualifications that will enable them to advance to higher levels of 
education and attain desirable employment and social positions. It is widely believed that schools are 
meritocratic with academic success being based solely on ability; according to this belief, schools 
provide each student with an equal chance to acquire academic credentials by using fair and 
objective methods such as grades and test scores. However, Bourdieu (1973) contends that the 
notion that schools are meritocratic is false and serves to legitimize the perpetuation of social 
hierarchies. 
From Bourdieu’s perspective, students from the middle and upper classes are more likely to 
succeed in school because they already possess the types of embodied cultural capital that schools 
value. Consequently, such students are more likely to acquire higher academic credentials and 
professional or white-collar jobs. In contrast, it is more difficult for low SES or minority students to 
succeed in schools. From the start, they have less of the embodied cultural capital that is necessary 
to thrive in schools. Even though some of these students may succeed academically through 
extraordinary efforts, the majority of them are more likely to fail or underperform in schools. As a 
result, in contrast to the ideology of equal chances, Bourdieu argues that schools contribute to 
reproducing existing social hierarchies. 
Therefore, a key condition for high-stakes testing and accountability policies to succeed is 
whether they provide increased opportunities for low-income and minority students to acquire 
academic qualifications. This is a critical issue given the substantial number of U.S. students who 
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drop out of high school and the significant gap between white students and African American and 
Hispanic students with regard to dropout rates. Mishel and Roy (2006) estimated that the overall 
high school graduation rate in the U.S. was between 80 and 83 percent in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Further, they estimated that the graduation rate for African Americans ranged from 69 to 75 percent 
during this time while the graduation rate for Hispanics ranged from 61 to 74 percent (Mishel & 
Roy, 2006). 
To the extent that dropout rates among low-income and racial minority students remain the 
same or increase under high-stakes testing policies, it seems likely that such policies would not be 
helping such students acquire institutionalized cultural capital. On the other hand, even when high-
stakes testing policies reduce the dropout rates among such groups, it would be important for low 
SES and minority students to also have opportunities to acquire embodied cultural capital to succeed 
in higher education and in their careers. 
Methods 
In selecting the major objects of analysis in this paper, we employed several criteria. First, we 
elected to focus on one state serving high percentages of racial minority students and one large 
urban school district to consider similarities and differences across these contexts with regard to the 
effects of high-stakes testing on cultural capital. Second, we were strongly interested in jurisdictions 
that had enacted high-stakes testing and accountability policies in the 1990s prior to the 
implementation of No Child Left Behind . The first two criteria led us to focus on Texas and 
Chicago in this article. 
Texas was known as a leading state in this area in the 1990s and it served as a model for 
NCLB (Haney, 2000; McNeil, 2005). The state adopted the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
(TAAS) in the early 1990s, requiring students to take high-stakes tests in grades 4, 8, and 10. Based 
primarily on the percentage of students passing each of the TAAS tests, schools were rated as 
exemplary, recognized, acceptable or unacceptable. Schools were eligible for cash awards for high 
ratings, whereas underperforming ones were subject to sanctions, including possible closure.2 TAAS 
was a high-stakes test not only for schools but also for students. For example, if students did not 
pass all three portions of the exit level version of TAAS, they could not graduate from high school, 
regardless of their course grades. Only the scores on the state test counted as evidence in deciding 
whether a student was promoted or retained, and whether they earned a high school diploma or not 
(Haney, 2000; McNeil, 2005). 
In the spring of 1995, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) declared an end to social 
promotion, meaning that every student had to meet requirements to advance to the next grade. In 
1996, a new accountability program took effect based on students’ test scores on high-stakes tests. 
Under this new program, 3rd, 6th, and 8th graders had to meet minimum test-score standards in 
reading and mathematics on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) to move to the next grade. The cut 
scores were set to correspond to scoring roughly at the 20th percentile on national norms (Roderick, 
Jacob & Bryk, 2002). Students who did not meet the cutoff standard at the end of the school year 
                                                 
2 For schools to earn an exemplary rating, at least 90 percent of all students must pass each subject 
area. The standard for recognized increased from at least 65 percent of students passing in 1994 to 70 percent 
in 2000; the standard for  acceptable went from at least 25 percent passing to 30 percent; and the standard for 
low-performing went from less than 25 percent to less than 30 percent. See Haney (2000) and Gordon & 
Reese (1997) for more details.  
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were required to participate in a summer school program and to retake the tests in August. Those 
who failed again at that time were to be retained in their grade.  
With regard to student demographics, in 1997–98, shortly after the implementation of 
TAAS, 45 percent of the 3.9 million PreK–12 students in Texas were white, 38 percent were 
Hispanic, and 14 percent were African American (Texas Education Agency, 1998). In 2005–06, of 
the 4.5 million PreK–12 students in Texas, 45 percent were Hispanic, 37 percent were white, and 15 
percent were African American (Texas Education Agency, 2006). In 1995–96, when CPS declared its 
new promotional policy, 54 percent of its 407,000 students were African American, 31 percent were 
Hispanic, and 11 percent were white (Catalyst Chicago, n.d.). By 2005–06, CPS was serving about 
420,000 students, 85 percent of whom were from low-income families, 49 percent of whom were 
African American, and 38 percent of whom were Hispanic (Chicago Public Schools, n.d.).  
Third, each study featured in this article included measures of instruction and student 
learning (which are closely related to embodied cultural capital) or measures of students’ test scores, 
high school graduation rates, or post-secondary outcomes (which are all forms of institutionalized 
cultural capital).  
For both jurisdictions (Texas and Chicago), we drew on the theoretical framework described 
above to analyze the ways in which and the extent to which their high-stakes testing and 
accountability policies seemed to affect opportunities for low-income and racial minority students to 
acquire embodied and institutionalized cultural capital. Further, we considered whether these 
policies seemed to reduce, increase, or have no effect on differences in cultural capital between low 
SES, minority students and white, middle-class students.  
Apparent Effects of Texas’ Accountability System on Cultural Capital 
High-stakes testing and accountability policy in Texas was the model for the federal No 
Child Left Behind legislation. Before his election in 2000, President Bush was the governor of Texas, 
and his first U.S. Secretary of Education, Rod Paige, had served as the superintendent of the 
Houston Independent School District. The close connection between NCLB and Texas continued 
with U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings who had worked on an education reform 
commission under Texas Governor William Clements and as associate executive director for the 
Texas Association of School Boards. As Grissmer and Flanagan (1998, 2001) argued, African 
American and Hispanic students made large gains on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
(TAAS) and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in the 1990s, meaning that 
the Texas model for accountability seemed to contribute to reducing the gap among students who 
had different levels of cultural capital. However, other studies revealed that this accountability 
system seemed to have a mixed impact, including some harmful effects, on low-income and racial 
minority students (Haney, 2000; McNeil, 2005; McNeil & Valenzuela, 2001). 
After Texas adopted its new accountability system in the early 1990s, test scores on the 
TAAS improved for all three of the major racial groups in the state: Hispanics, African Americans, 
and whites. For instance, Table 1 shows the percentage of grade 10 students meeting the TAAS 
minimum expectations between 1994 and 2002. The table demonstrates a notable increase in the 
percentages of 10th graders meeting the state expectations in all subject areas. In particular, there 
were substantial percentage increases among low-income and racial minority students. For example, 
in 1994, only 28 percent of African American students passed the 10th-grade TAAS exams; in 2002, 
78 percent passed these exams. 
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Table 1 
Grade 10 Students Meeting TAAS Minimum Expectations in 1994 and 2002 
Reading Mathematics Writing All tests taken 1994 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002 
All students 75% 94% 55% 92% 79% 91% 50% 85% 
African American 60% 92% 32% 85% 68% 90% 28% 78% 
Hispanic 61% 90% 40% 88% 69% 85% 34% 77% 
White 86% 98% 68% 96% 88% 96% 64% 92% 
Economically 
Disadvantaged 58% 90% 39% 87% 66% 85% 32% 76% 
Limited-English 29% 66% 25% 71% 38% 47% 13% 39% 
Source: Texas Education Agency (2007) 
 
As a result of rapid gains among minority students, racial gaps in performance reportedly 
narrowed. In 1994, among all students in grades 3–8 and 10, only 31 percent of African American 
students passed the TAAS as compared to 66 percent of whites. By 1999, the gap between the two 
groups had been reduced to 24 percentage points and by 2002, it had shrunk to 15 percentage points 
(McNeil, 2005). A similar trend was found between Hispanic students and whites as well, which 
appears to support the notion that the new policy in Texas not only improved students’ academic 
achievement but also reduced the gaps in achievement among students who may have entered 
school with different levels of cultural capital. 
In contrast to these findings, other researchers have argued that these gains on TAAS and 
NAEP may not have represented the academic capacities of all Texas children (Gordon & Reese, 
1997; Haney, 2000; McNeil, 2005; McNeil & Valenzuela, 2001). In particular, these scholars have 
shown ways in which the accountability system in Texas had strongly adverse impacts on low-
income and minority students. Based on survey and interview data from more than 100 teachers, 
Gordon and Reese (1997) reported widespread harmful effects of TAAS on low-income and 
minority students. The researchers contended that scores on TAAS were viewed by many of the 
teachers in their study as an objective criterion that confirmed at-risk students’ failing performance; 
further, the results of the TAAS led many teachers to withdraw their support for such students 
when, in fact, these were the very students who needed additional support. 
In a study that employed interview and observation data, McNeil and Valenzuela (2001) 
contended that TAAS had significantly changed the substance of schooling; i.e., what was taught and 
how students learned. They argued that during reading, writing, and mathematics instruction, 
teachers often placed greater emphasis on test preparation activities than implementing a rigorous, 
intellectually demanding curriculum. More recently, based on qualitative data collected from an 
urban elementary school in Texas, Booher-Jennings (2005) argued that teachers divided students 
into three groups—“safe cases,” “suitable cases for treatment,” and “hopeless cases”—with school 
resources distributed unequally to these groups. In her study, teachers targeted “suitable cases” who 
were on the threshold of passing the state tests and thus were likely to increase the school’s 
aggregate passing rate, while withdrawing attention and resources from “hopeless” students. To the 
extent that this occurred, low SES and racial minority students lost opportunities to acquire 
embodied cultural capital in the form of higher-order thinking, analytical writing, and problem-
solving skills. 
In our analysis, we also focused on studies that examined the effects of high-stakes testing 
and accountability policy in Texas on opportunities for low SES and racial minority students to 
acquire institutionalized cultural capital. Despite its negative effects on these students’ access to 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 16 No. 6 8 
embodied cultural capital, the state’s policy might still have had positive results if it led to improved 
test scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and lower dropout rates 
among these students. With regard to these two measures, the state’s accountability policy seemed to 
have mixed results, including some negative consequences. 
Grissmer and Flanagan (1998, 2001) provided data showing that, along with North Carolina, 
Texas made the largest gains on the NAEP between 1990 and 1997. Further, even though both 
African American and white elementary students’ scores increased, it appeared that African 
American students made larger gains than white students in reading and mathematics. The authors 
insisted that this progress was not due to traditional explanations of improved student outcomes 
such as per-pupil spending, teacher/pupil ratios, and percentages of teachers with advanced degrees 
or more years of experience. This was because Texas and North Carolina ranked at or below the 
national averages on these measures during the years of the study. Instead, Grissmer and Flanagan 
argued that the key reform policies associated with the NAEP gains in these two states were state-
wide academic standards by grade, holding all students accountable to the same standards, state-wide 
assessments closely linked to standards, and accountability systems based on student test scores. In 
short, they insisted that the rapid academic growth among Texas and North Carolina students was 
due to tightened accountability systems.3  
Other researchers have raised concerns regarding Texas’ apparent improvements on NAEP 
in the 1990s. First, in pointing out that Grissmer and Flanagan used NAEP reading data only for the 
1992 and 1994 administrations of the exam, Treisman and Fuller (2001) included data from NAEP 
in 1992, 1994, and 1998 and argued that the gains among African American and Hispanic students 
between 1994 and 1998 were less significant. They also argued that the academic gains among Texas 
students were not just a product of the heightened accountability system but also of wider efforts 
such as equalizing school funding that Grissmer and Flanagan underestimated. Second, McNeil and 
Valenzuela (2001) pointed out that “the attention has been more on the rate of improvement on 
NAEP rather than actual improvement” (p. 130). They argued that, even after the highly touted 
gains in mathematics and reading, the state’s performance was still at or below average of national 
scores, registering lower than 21 of the 40 states participating in NAEP (McNeil & Valenzuela, 
2001). 
Further, Haney (2000) and McNeil (2005) argued that the state’s NAEP gains seemed to be 
due to excluding students not expected to do well on the tests. In administering NAEP, school 
districts, schools and students were to be randomly sampled among participating states, but school 
personnel could remove students who they had classified as Limited English Proficient (LEP) or 
who had Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) as part of special education programs. McNeil 
(2005) argued that Texas had excluded higher percentages of students from taking the NAEP tests 
than most other states. From 1992 to 1996, exclusion rates in Texas increased from 8 percent to 11 
percent at grade 4, and from 7 percent to 8 percent at grade 8. In contrast, the national exclusion 
rates decreased between 1992 and 1996 from 8 percent to 6 percent at grade 4 and from 7 percent to 
5 percent at grade 8.4 In sum, while Grissmer and Flanagan (1998, 2001) argued that high-stakes 
                                                 
3 The testing policies in these two states are known to feature higher stakes than those in other states 
in the U.S. According to Amrein and Berliner (2002), among ten indicators of high stakes such as ties with 
graduation, promotion, financial awards, staff replacement, or public reporting, these two states appear to 
each feature eight of the indicators, the highest number among 18 states that had adopted a state mandated 
test at the time of the study. 
4 Note that the time period reported on here for the exclusion rates largely overlapped with that in 
Grissmer and Flanagan (1998), which was based on data from 1992 to 1997.  
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testing led to Texas students’ rapid gains on NAEP, it appears that the state’s substantial exclusion 
of students may also have affected its performance on this national assessment. 
In addition, we need to consider that the high school graduation rate in Texas is fairly low; in 
a 2001 report, it was 67 percent, ranked 40th in the nationwide order (Greene, 2002). Table 2 shows 
high school graduates in 2000–2001 as a percentage of average enrollments in grades seven to nine 
in the four largest school districts in Texas. The data in Table 2 indicates that roughly half of the 
students who were in 9th grade in 1997–98 in these four districts did not graduate from high schools 
in these districts in 2000–2001.  
 
Table 2 
High School Graduation Rates in Major School Districts in Texas 





Austin Independent School District 18,179 3,496 58% 
San Antonio ISD  14,498 2,619 54% 
Houston ISD 47,337 7,735 49% 
Dallas ISD 36,777 5,837 48% 
Source: McNeil, 20055 
 
The racial gap in high school graduation rates also increased after the implementation of 
TAAS. Between 1992 and 1998, the ratio of high school graduates to grade 9 students three years 
earlier had been at or below 0.50 for African American and Hispanic students, while it had been 
about 0.70 for white students (Clarke et. al., 2000). According to Haney (2000), from 1978 through 
1989, the average gap between the ratio for white students and the ratio for African American and 
Hispanic students had been 0.146. However, the average gap between the ratio for whites and that 
for non-whites students grew to 0.215 after the TAAS exit test requirement was fully implemented 
in 1992–1993. This indicates that the TAAS exit test had caused a 50 percent increase in the gap 
between the ratio for white students and the ratio for non-white students. McNeil argued that the 
Texas accountability system itself “creat(ed) incentives for principals to ‘lose’ their low-performing 
students, more frequently their Latino, African American, LEP, and immigrant children, to make 
sure the schools’ scores are high” (2005, p. 74). She also contended that a widespread waiver system 
in Texas schools was the primary cause of this large loss of students; to improve the performance of 
their schools on the 10th-grade exams (i.e., high school exit exams), many administrators, teachers, 
and counselors held African American and Hispanic students back in 9th grade (Haney, 2000; 
McNeil, 2005). 
In sum, Texas’ accountability system had mixed effects on opportunities for low SES and 
racial minority students to acquire cultural capital. While some researchers reported that students’ 
scores on TAAS increased in the 1990s and racial gaps in achievement decreased, other studies 
raised concerns about the effects of high stakes testing on classroom instruction and high school 
graduation rates. In particular, the accountability system seemed to dramatically alter the substance 
of schooling and to lead many districts and schools to exclude students from taking the state tests. 
Further, the racial gap in high school graduation rates increased following the implementation of 
TAAS. As a result, while the state tests provided opportunities for some low-income and minority 
students to acquire cultural capital, they led many others to leave school without their diplomas—a 
key form of institutionalized cultural capital. 
                                                 
5 The original table in McNeil (2005, pp. 78–82) shows data for 94 school districts in Texas. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 16 No. 6 10 
Apparent Effects of Chicago’s Accountability System on Cultural Capital 
The Chicago Public Schools (CPS) is the nation’s third largest school district and it 
predominantly serves low-income and racial minority students. In the spring of 1995, CPS declared 
an end to social promotion, meaning that every student had to meet requirements to advance to the 
next grade. In 1996, a new accountability program took effect based on students’ test scores on 
high-stakes tests. Under this new program, 3rd, 6th, and 8th graders had to meet minimum test-
score standards in reading and mathematics on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) to move to the 
next grade. The cut scores were set to correspond to scoring roughly at the 20th percentile on 
national norms (Roderick, Jacob & Bryk, 2002). Students who did not meet the cutoff standard at 
the end of the school year were required to participate in summer school programs and to retake the 
tests in August. Those who failed again at that time were to be retained in their grade.  
In the case of grade 8, those who did not pass the second time either were retained or 
moved into a transition center. Transition centers were new schools designed for 8th graders who 
failed to meet the promotion requirement but were too old—more than 15 years old—to remain in 
elementary schools.6 As a result of the new promotion policy, more than one third of grade 3, grade 
6, and grade 8 students failed to meet the promotion cutoffs in the first two years (Roderick, et al., 
1999). Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) reported that, among Chicago students in the gate grades (i.e., 
grades 3, 6, and 8), 7,000 to 10,000 students were retained each year between 1996 and the early–
2000s. 
Proponents of retention policies argued that establishing cutoff standards, making clear that 
achievement matters, and imposing negative consequences would lead students to work harder and 
teachers to pay attention to the needs of the lower-performing students. They also contended that if 
students have not mastered basic skills, they would be better served by repeating the same grade and 
gaining those skills than by struggling with more advanced materials (Roderick & Nagaoka, 2005). In 
other words, it was expected that making clear what needs to be taught for the students to pass the 
promotion gate would help them acquire embodied cultural capital valued in schools and society. 
Indeed, after the inception of the new accountability program, Chicago students’ test scores rose to 
some extent and the proportion of students in the gate grades with test scores below the minimum 
standard for promotion fell significantly. For example, in grade 6, the percentage of students who 
failed to meet the promotional cutoff fell from 37 percent in 1995, the year before the policy took 
effect, to 14 percent in 1999 (Roderick & Nagaoka, 2005). Further, using achievement data from 
3rd-, 6th-, and 8th-graders between 1990 and 2000, Jacob (2002) found that students’ scores on the 
ITBS reading and math tests consistently increased after the implementation of the new promotion 
policy.  
As in Texas, though, the new retention policy in Chicago seemed to have a negative impact 
on opportunities for low SES and racial minority students to acquire embodied cultural capital. 
Through a further analysis of math scores, Jacob (2002) argued that the large ITBS gains were driven 
primarily by questions testing basic skills, such as computation and number concepts, which were 
easier to teach through the district’s ITBS-specific curriculum. In contrast, students made very little 
improvement on questions requiring more complex skills such as estimation, data interpretation and 
problem solving. He also found that students’ math achievement on the ITBS tests had little 
relationship with their performance on the state IGAP (Illinois Goals Assessment Program) tests, 
which placed more emphasis on critical thinking and problem-solving skills (Jacob, 2002). 
                                                 
6 From 1997–98 to the early 2000s, 40 to 50 percent of failed 8th graders enrolled in transition 
centers each year (Allensworth, 2004).   
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Other studies also corroborate the contention that improved test scores do not mean that 
students have learned higher-order thinking and academic skills. Based on qualitative data from four 
Chicago elementary schools and interviews with CPS district administrators, Lipman (2004) reported 
that test preparation for students had replaced potentially rich educational experiences in many 
urban schools. In her words, “students spend hours taking mock tests, practicing filling in bubbles in 
scantron sheets, developing familiarity with the layout of the tests and the kinds of questions that are 
asked, and learning ‘tricks’ for eliminating incorrect answers” (Lipman, 2004, p. 79). As in Texas 
schools, the focus on reading and mathematics testing had led schools to place less emphasis on 
social studies, science, and other subjects that were not tested in the accountability system. In one 
school, for example, Lipman (2004) observed that teachers stopped teaching social studies and 
concentrated on reading and mathematics instruction from January through May.  
Lipman also contended that while more affluent students in Chicago were engaged in 
intellectually challenging curriculum, low-income and minority students had to memorize 
fragmented facts and information and master simple test-taking techniques. She argued that this 
differential access to high-quality curriculum had significant consequences for social inequalities in 
an information-based economy. That is, white students who already possessed embodied cultural 
capital valued by schools were more likely to advance to higher education and attain professional, 
managerial and technical jobs. On the other hand, low SES and minority students in urban schools 
were more likely to take low-level, low-skill, and low-paid jobs in Chicago’s growing service 
economy. As a result, differentiated access to rigorous curriculum seemed to contribute to 
reproducing the asymmetrical social structure.  
In another study, Anagnostopoulos (2006) observed demoted 9th graders’ classrooms in two 
Chicago high schools,7 providing evidence regarding the unequal distribution of opportunities to 
acquire embodied cultural capital. Rather than compelling teachers and students to remedy school 
failure academically, the CPS retention policy facilitated a type of moral boundary work that 
distinguished “deserving” students from those deemed “undeserving” (Anagnostopoulos, 2006). In 
particular, teachers and students did not regard test scores as an expression of academic abilities. 
Rather, they employed a moral judgment to draw a line between promoted and demoted students. 
That is, both teachers and students “described demoted students as ‘lazy,’ ‘apathetic,’ ‘disruptive’ 
and even ‘criminal’” (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, p. 17). In other words, teachers and students did not 
think that demoted students had difficulties in learning and thus needed additional support. Instead, 
they believed that they did not work hard enough and thus did not deserve care and attention.  
From the teachers’ perspectives, the moral designation of demoted students justified placing 
them at the margins of the school’s moral order and withdrawing instructional resources from them. 
For example, teachers spent a higher percentage of time on management in demoted classes than in 
promoted or mixed classes. On average, teachers in the demoted classes spent almost 20 percent of 
class time on management and discipline whereas they spent approximately 14 to 15 percent of 
allotted time on these activities in promoted and mixed classes (Anagnostopoulos, 2006). Further, 
students in demoted classes spent fully 25 percent of their time in class engaged in non-academic 
activities. Consequently, demoted students who had already been marginalized in school were 
further excluded from access to embodied cultural capital, which contradicted the promise made by 
advocates of high-stakes testing: that a challenging and rigorous curriculum would be provided to all 
students.  
                                                 
7 In one school, 90 percent of students were from low-income families and 92 percent were from 
racial minority backgrounds. In the other school, 72 percent of students were from low-income families and 
98 percent were racial minority. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 16 No. 6 12 
With regard to institutionalized cultural capital, researchers have shown that the promotional 
policy in Chicago had disproportional effects on low-income and racial minority students. When 
CPS placed 109 schools on probation—71 elementary and 38 high schools—for their low passing 
rates in 1996, the average poverty level of the 71 elementary schools was about 94 percent, meaning 
that probation schools were overwhelmingly African American and Hispanic schools (Lipman, 
2004). In 1998, among 8th graders enrolled in transition centers, 71 percent were African American 
students, 25 percent were Hispanic students, and 3 percent were white students (PURE, 1999).8 This 
higher rate of grade retention among African American students seemed likely to eventually result in 
higher dropout rates. Based on data from 1992 to 1998, Allensworth (2004) estimated that retained 
students’ likelihood of dropping out increased by 8 percent by age 17 and by 13 percent by age 19. 
As a result, she argued that, whereas white and Hispanic students’ dropout rates had declined in 
those years, African American students’ dropout rates did not show any significant changes.  
Other research studies indicate that the CPS policy provided little advantage to retained 
students. For example, comparing the achievement growth of students whose test scores fell just 
above and just below the test-score cutoff,9 Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) contend that retention did 
not provide significant academic benefits to 3rd graders who were retained and had more negative 
effects on 6th graders who were retained. In their study, 3rd graders in the retained below-cutoff 
group experienced a slight boost in performance in the post-gate year. This effect, however, was 
small and short-lived; within two years, the achievement growth of the below-cutoff group was not 
statistically different than that of the above-cutoff group. Further, according to the authors, within 
two years of the gate grade, the possibility for retained 3rd graders to be placed in special education 
was almost three times higher than that of other low-achieving students (Roderick & Nagaoka, 
2005).  
In the case of 6th graders, the authors found that retention was associated with more 
negative growth in achievement one year after the gate grade, with that effect remaining two years 
later. Retained 6th graders were placed in special education at more than six times the rates of other 
low-achieving students. Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) argue that these findings were consistent with 
other research findings that retention had more harmful effects on matured students who were more 
sensitive to their social reputation. These findings suggest that the CPS retention policy had different 
effects on two groups of students—one retained and the other promoted—who in fact had similar 
academic capacities. Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) presume that this was because most retained 
students were concentrated in low resource schools that could not afford to provide additional 
supports for them. They also point out that CPS provided little guidance to teachers in diagnosing 
retained students’ learning difficulties, devising effective instructional strategies, or providing 
learning materials. Rather, the “basic theory of action was that a second dose of the same material 
would be enough” (Roderick & Nagaoka, 2005, p. 332).  
In sum, despite some gains in students’ academic achievement, the promotional policy in 
Chicago may not have helped low-income and minority students acquire necessary cultural capital; 
instead, it seemed to narrow the curriculum and make it harder for those students to acquire higher-
order thinking, writing, and problem-solving skills. Further, researchers found that retained students 
were disproportionately low-income and minority and that these students experienced few academic 
                                                 
8 Allensworth (2004) reported that 3,900 students were repeating or entering a transition center in 
1998. 
9 Those students whose scores fell just above the cutoff were promoted whereas those whose scores 
fell below the cutoff were retained.  
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benefits and many social challenges. As a result, it seemed unlikely that being retained enabled them 
to acquire embodied and institutionalized cultural capital. 
Conclusion  
In recent years, researchers in the U.S. have drawn on Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital 
(1973, 1986) to examine a number of educational issues. For example, Lareau has done pioneering 
work on how cultural capital influences home-school relations and parent-child interactions (Lareau, 
2002; Lareau & Horvat, 1999) while Olneck (2000) has analyzed whether multicultural education 
curriculum and schooling practices are likely to redefine what constitutes cultural capital. This study 
contributes to this body of scholarship by considering the effects of high-stakes testing and 
accountability on minority and low-income students’ access to cultural capital. In particular, we drew 
on research from Texas and Chicago to investigate the effects of such policies on students’ 
opportunities to acquire embodied and institutionalized cultural capital. 
In both contexts, there were indications that students’ performance on state or district tests 
increased following the implementation of high-stakes testing and accountability policies. In Texas, 
the performance of all racial groups increased on both TAAS and NAEP during the 1990s. Similarly, 
the performance of students in the gate grades (i.e., grades 3, 6, and 8) improved after the enactment 
of the new accountability program in 1996. At the same time, research from Texas and Chicago 
revealed that these accountability policies seemed to have had deleterious effects on curriculum, 
instruction, the percentage of students excluded from the tests, and student dropout rates. These 
findings are consistent with the work of Shepard (2000), Darling-Hammond (2004a), and others 
who have written of the likely negative repercussions of high-stakes testing and accountability 
policies.  
There are some limitations to our analysis and the studies included herein. First, most studies 
of the effects of accountability policies on curriculum and instruction included small samples of 
teachers and schools. In future studies on this topic, it would be advisable for researchers to include 
larger numbers of teachers and schools and to control for the possible effects of school and student 
characteristics. Second, these studies from Texas and Chicago focused on policies first implemented 
in the 1990s. It will be important for future research on high-stakes testing to consider the impact of 
NCLB itself in particular state and district contexts. Finally, data on dropout rates is often subject to 
multiple interpretations because of variability in the way such rates are measured and difficulty in 
obtaining reliable data. At the same time, to assess the effects of testing and accountability policies 
on institutionalized cultural capital, it will be necessary for researchers to have good data on high 
school completion rates and college attendance rates. 
Despite these limitations, the research findings from Texas and Chicago seem to provide a 
number of guidelines as policy makers consider ways to revise NCLB as part of reauthorizing Title I 
in 2008 and 2009. First, there is a need to consider how high-stakes testing and accountability 
policies influence curriculum and instruction. In particular, research from Connecticut suggests that 
testing policies can be designed to promote cognitively advanced instruction while holding schools 
and districts accountable for performance (Darling-Hammond, 2004b; Youngs & Bell, 2007). 
Second, policy makers need to ensure that districts and schools do not respond to accountability 
policies by excluding students from taking tests. Finally, they need to continue exploring ways to 
make high school a meaningful, engaging, and cognitively demanding experience for all students 
(Sizer, 1984). While high-stakes tests provide important information about student performance, 
they will not, by themselves, lead to the types of reform at the high school level that would enable 
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greater numbers of low-income and racial minority students to acquire embodied or institutionalized 
cultural capital. 
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